This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.

• Cover
• Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India
• Series page
• Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa
• Copyright page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations for Classical Texts
• Introduction
  • 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India
  • 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism
  • 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents
  • 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy
  • Notes
• Chapter 1
  • Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy
    • 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots
    • 1.2 Skepticism in the Ṛg Veda: The Shadow of Philosophical Inquiry
    • 1.3 Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, and Kena Upaniṣads
    • 1.4 Materialism, Sañjayan Eel-Wriggling, and Early Buddhist Quietism
    • 1.5: Can Skepticism about Philosophy be a Tradition?: Vitaṇḍa, Prasaṅga, and Prasajya
    • 1.6 Conclusion: Previewing the Fruits of these Skeptical Roots
    • Notes
• Chapter 2
  • Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist Skepticism
    • 2.1 Interpreting Nāgārjuna: Mysticism, Anti-Realism, and Epistemological Skepticism
    • 2.2 The Middle Way between Mysticism and Anti-Realism
    • 2.3 Nāgārjuna’s Two Phases
    • 2.4 How Skepticism about Philosophy Takes Both Phases Seriously
    • 2.5 Nāgārjuna’s Development of Early Buddhist Quietism: Religiosity without Belief
    • 2.6 Other Historical Precedents: Candrakīrti, Kumārajīva, Khedrupjey’s Opponent, and Patsab Nyimadrak
    • 2.7 Conclusion
    • Notes
• Chapter 3
  • Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism
    • 3.1 An Overview of Nāgārjuna’s Argumentative Strategies
    • 3.2 Brief Tour of Arguments Concerning the Means of Knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī
    • 3.3 Nāgārjuna’s Critique of Theories of Causation
    • 3.4 Conventionalist, Anti-Realist, and Epistemological Skeptical Interpretations
    • 3.5 The Cause of Skepticism
    • 3.6 Conclusion: Combining Analysis-Insight and Quietism
    • Notes
• Chapter 4
  • Jayarāśi’s Cārvāka Skepticism
    • 4.1 The Need for Cārvāka Studies
    • 4.2 Jayarāśi’s Method of Destruction: Developing the Materialist and Sañjayan Strains of Early Indian Skepticism
    • 4.3 Jayarāśian Contextualism
    • 4.4 A Contextualist Response to the Inconsistency Objection
    • 4.5 How to Stop Worrying and Love a Life without Philosophy or Religion
    • 4.6 Conclusion
    • Notes
• Chapter 5
  • Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology
    • 5.1 Jayarāśi’s Denial of Epistemological Realism
    • 5.2 Buddhist Epistemological Realism: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti
    • 5.3 The Non-Establishment of Difference Argument
    • 5.4 The Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument
    • 5.5 The Delightful Destruction of Epistemology and Jayarāśi’s Skepticism About Philosophy
    • 5.6 Conclusion
    • Notes
• Chapter 6
  • Śrī Harṣa’s Advaita Skepticism
    • 6.1 The Rise of Advaita Vedānta and the Continuing Refinement of Realism
    • 6.2 Interpreting Śrī Harṣa: Negative Dialectic, Positive Idealism, and Non-Realism
    • 6.3 The Critique of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Realism
    • 6.4 The Possibility of Mystical Experience
    • 6.5 Śrī Harṣa’s Development of Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism
    • 6.6 Conclusion
    • Notes
• Chapter 7
  • Śrī Harṣa on Knowledge, Existence, and the Limits of Philosophy
    • 7.1 Debate and the Means of Knowledge
    • 7.2 Critique of Concepts of Existence (sattā/tattva)
    • 7.3 Śrī Harṣa and the Limits of Philosophy
    • 7.4 Anti-dogmatism and the Possibility of Mysticism
    • 7.5 Conclusion
    • Notes
• Conclusion
  • Reflecting on the Argument of This Book: Whither Philosophy?
  • Skepticism about Philosophy as a Cross-Cultural Phenomenon
  • Memes, Mysteries, and the Limits of Thought
  • An Argument for Mitigated Skepticism about Philosophy
  • Expanding the History and Future of Philosophy
  • Notes
• References
• Index
• About the Author