Электронная библиотека Финансового университета

     
?

Детальная информация
Карточка Таблица RUSMARC

International Monetary Fund. European Department (Series).
Reassessing the role of state-owned enterprises in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe / Christine Richmond [and 16 others], in collaboration with EBRD staff. — 1 online resource (xi, 114 pages). — (International Monetary Fund. European Department). — <URL:http://elib.fa.ru/ebsco/2181261.pdf>.

Дата создания записи: 07.07.2019

Тематика: Government business enterprises; Government business enterprises; Government business enterprises

Коллекции: EBSCO

Разрешенные действия: –

Действие 'Прочитать' будет доступно, если вы выполните вход в систему или будете работать с сайтом на компьютере в другой сети Действие 'Загрузить' будет доступно, если вы выполните вход в систему или будете работать с сайтом на компьютере в другой сети

Группа: Анонимные пользователи

Сеть: Интернет

Права на использование объекта хранения

Место доступа Группа пользователей Действие
Локальная сеть Финуниверситета Все Прочитать Печать Загрузить
Интернет Читатели Прочитать Печать
-> Интернет Анонимные пользователи

Оглавление

  • Cover
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Executive Summary
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Stylized Facts on SOEs in the CESEE Region
  • 3. Rationale and Objectives of State Ownership
  • 4. State-Owned Enterprise Performance
    • Are SOEs as Efficient and Profitable as Private Firms
    • Why are SOEs Less Productive than Their Private Counterparts
  • 5. State-Owned Banks and Links to SOEs
    • Background
    • Stylized Facts on SOBs and DBs in the CESEE Region
    • How Do CESEE Region SOBs Perform Compared to Private Banks
    • A Deeper Look at Why SOBs Have Relatively Lower Profitability
    • Financial Soundness
    • SOB-SOE Lending Links
  • 6. Are (Nonfinancial) State Ownership Objectives Being Achieved
    • Supply of Public Goods and Services
    • Support of Social Objectives
  • 7. SOE Corporate Governance
    • Ownership Policy
    • Financial Oversight
    • Fiscal and Policy Interactions
    • SOE Oversight Index
    • Does Better Governance Affect SOE Performance
  • 8. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
    • Conclusions
    • Policy Recommendations
  • Annex 1. Definitions of SOE and SOB Used in the Paper
  • Annex 2. SOE Data Survey
  • Annex 3. Filtering and Cleaning the Orbis Sample
  • Annex 4. Resource Misallocation and Total Factor Productivity
  • Annex 5. Calculating Resource Allocation Efficiency Using Firm-Level Data
  • Annex 6. Effect of State Ownership on Productivity
  • Annex 7. State-Owned and Private Banks
  • Annex 8. Matching Banks and Firms
  • Annex 9. SOR Oversight Index
  • References
  • Boxes
    • Box 1. The Russian State: Size and Footprint
    • Box 2. SOE Performance in Belarus
    • Box 3. SOEs in Croatia
    • Box 4. Ownership Structure and Productivity: Evidence from Poland
    • Box 5. The NLB Case: Ambitions of a Private Bank with Flawed Governance
    • Box 6. The Role of National Development Financing Entities in CESEE
    • Box 7. Belarus and Serbia: Government Financing of SOEs and SOBs
    • Box 8. PKP Reorganization: From Cost-Cutting to Privatization Efforts
    • Box 9. The Slovalco Case: Supporting the Privatization of a Large Company Through the Back Door
    • Box 10. Naftogaz Group (Ukraine) 2014 Restructuring
    • Box 11. ESM: Sector Restructuring and Focused Privatization
  • Figures
    • Figure 1. OECD: SOE Employment vs. Number of SOEs
    • Figure 2. SOE Prevalence
    • Figure 3. SOE Footprint
    • Figure 4. Evolution of SOE Footprint (2005–2016)
    • Figure 5. State Footprint in Different Sectors of the Economy
    • Figure 6. Objectives for SOE Ownership
    • Figure 7. Revenue per Employee, 2014–2016
    • Figure 8. Distribution of Revenue per Employee, 2014–2016
    • Figure 9. Revenue per Employee, 2014–2016
    • Figure 10. Employee Cost Share in Operating Revenue, 2014–2016
    • Figure 11. SOE Wage Premium, 2016
    • Figure 12. Distribution of Return on Equity, 2014–2016
    • Figure 13. Distribution of Return on Equity, 2014–2016
    • Figure 14. SOE Productivity
    • Figure 15. Relationship between Misallocation and SOE Share of Sector Output
    • Figure 16. Optimal Allocations of Capital and Labor by SOEs
    • Figure 17. Output Gains by SOEs Moving to Private Sector Productivity Distribution
    • Figure 18. Public Bank Assets Share in the Banking System, 2016
    • Figure 19. Business Models
    • Figure 20. Profitability of Private Banks versus SOBs
    • Figure 21. Decomposition of Return on Assets
    • Figure 22. Financial Soundness Indicators
    • Figure 23. Profits per Type of Firm, per Type of Bank
    • Figure 24. NPL Ratios, 2006–16
    • Figure 25. Current to Total Assets, 2014–2016
    • Figure 26. Public Capital Stock and Infrastructure Quality
    • Figure 27. Financial Inclusion
    • Figure 28. Gross Job Reallocation
    • Figure 29. Net Employment Dynamics
    • Figure 30. Performance Around the GFC
    • Figure 31. Composite SOE Governance Index
    • Figure 32. Governance and SOE Performance
  • Tables
    • Table 1. Ownership Policy
    • Table 2. Financial Oversight Framework
    • Table 3. Fiscal and Policy Interactions

Статистика использования

stat Количество обращений: 0
За последние 30 дней: 0
Подробная статистика