European Union Law and Private International Law both attempt to resolve a conflict of laws. There is however a certain tension between the two disciplines. The present book proposes suggestions to enhance their mutual understanding.

• EU Law and Private International Law
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction: EU Private International Law
  • 1.1 Private International Law at a Turning Point
  • 1.2 The Structure of the Book
  • 1.3 The Communautarisation of Private International Law
    • 1.3.1 Legal Basis
    • 1.3.2 Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice
    • 1.3.3 Union Instruments
    • 1.3.4 A New Legal Basis in the Lisbon Treaty
    • 1.3.5 External Competences
    • 1.3.6 Regulation 662/2009
  • 1.4 Conflict of Laws Rules in Sectoral Instruments
  • 1.5 Influence of Primary Union Law upon the Conflict of Law Rules
    • 1.5.1 The Compatibility of Connecting Factors with the TFEU
  • 1.6 The Method of Interpretation
    • 1.6.1 The Method of Interpretation Relating to Rome I
  • 1.7 European Public Policy
• 2. Rome I Regulation: Party Autonomy as its Cornerstone
  • 2.1 A Birds-Eye View on the Development of Private International Law
    • 2.1.1 Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation
    • 2.1.2 The Content of the Common Rules
    • 2.1.3 Party Autonomy
    • 2.1.4 Party Autonomy in Rome I
    • 2.1.5 The Success of Party Autonomy
  • 2.2 The Function and Operation of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.2.1 The Origins of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.2.2 The Rome Convention
    • 2.2.3 Acceptance of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
  • 2.3 What are Overriding Mandatory Provisions?
    • 2.3.1 Mandatory vs Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.3.2 Ordre Public vs Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.3.3 Overriding Mandatory Provisions vs Unilateral Conflict of Laws Rules
    • 2.3.4 Definition of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.3.5 Crucial for Safeguarding the Political, Social or Economic Organisation of the State
    • 2.3.6 Union Law
    • 2.3.7 Conditions for Application
  • 2.4 Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.4.1 The Scope of the Applicable Law
    • 2.4.2 The Rome Convention
    • 2.4.3 Article 9 (3) Rome I: A Solution to a Political Problem
    • 2.4.4 Discretion or General Obligation to Apply Overriding Mandatory Provisions of Other Member States
  • 2.5 Party Autonomy, Protective Connecting Factors and Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.5.1 Distinguishing Between First and Second Generation Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.5.2 The Position of the ECJ
    • 2.5.3 Public or Private Interest in Article 9 (1) Rome I?
    • 2.5.4 Consumers
    • 2.5.5 Article 5 Rome Convention
    • 2.5.6 Article 6 Rome I
    • 2.5.7 The Residual Function of Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 2.5.8 Employees
  • 2.6 Special Connecting Factors
    • 2.6.1 Contracts of Carriage
    • 2.6.2 Insurance Contracts
  • 2.7 Intermediate Conclusions
• 3. Overriding Mandatory Provisions: The National Perspective
  • 3.1 France
    • 3.1.1 Classification
    • 3.1.2 Self Limitation
    • 3.1.3 Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions
  • 3.2 Germany
    • 3.2.1 Classification
    • 3.2.2 Self Limitation
    • 3.2.3 Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions
  • 3.3 The Netherlands
    • 3.3.1 Classification
    • 3.3.2 Self Limitation
    • 3.3.3 Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions
  • 3.4 The United Kingdom
    • 3.4.1 Classification
    • 3.4.2 Self Limitation
    • 3.4.3 Foreign Overriding Mandatory Provisions
  • 3.5 Comparative Conclusions
    • 3.5.1 The Necessity for a Preliminary Reference
• 4. The Scope of Secondary Union Law : A Matter for Rome I?
  • 4.1 Private International Law in Secondary Union Law Instruments
    • 4.1.1 Data Protection Directive
    • 4.1.2 Return of Cultural Objects Directive
    • 4.1.3 Timeshare Directive
    • 4.1.4 Unfair Contract Terms Directive
    • 4.1.5 Relationship to the Conflict of Laws Process
  • 4.2 An Autonomous Approach in the Consumer Acquis?
  • 4.3 Autonomous Determination of the International Scope of Application of Secondary Law
    • 4.3.1 Ingmar as Authority for an Autonomous Approach
    • 4.3.2 An Autonomous Approach via Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 4.3.3 An Autonomous Approach via (implicit) Unilateral Conflict of Law Rules
  • 4.4 Ingmar – A Judgment Open for Revision?
  • 4.5 The Legislative History of art. 23 Rome I Regulation
    • 4.5.1 Transformation into Rome I: The Wider Perspective
  • 4.6 Contracts Involving a Link with a Third Country
    • 4.6.1 Americanisation or Unfamiliarity with Conflict of Laws?
    • 4.6.2 A Possible Solution to the ‘Gran Canaria Problem’
  • 4.7 Unilateral Conflict of Law Rules in Secondary Law Reconsidered
    • 4.7.1 Exclusion of Private Autonomy
  • 4.8 Interim Conclusions
  • 4.9 An Autonomous Approach in Labour Law?
    • 4.9.1 The TUPE Directive
    • 4.9.2 The Worker Participation General Framework Directive
    • 4.9.3 Ordre Public
    • 4.9.4 Posted Workers Directive
  • 4.10 Unilateral Conflict of Law Rules in Insurance Contracts and Contracts of Carriage
    • 4.10.1 The Denied Boarding Regulation
    • 4.10.2 The Cabotage Transport Regulation
  • 4.11 Conclusions
• 5. The Harmonisation of Contract Law by the Union
  • 5.1 The Harmonisation of Contract Law
  • 5.2 The Issue of Competence
    • 5.2.1 Optional Instrument
    • 5.2.2 Redundancy of Private International Law
  • 5.3 The Feasibility of Common Rules
    • 5.3.1 Legal Innovation and Competition for the Best Legal System
    • 5.3.2 Varying Local Preferences
  • 5.4 Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Legal Products
    • 5.4.1 Homogeneous and Heterogeneous – Efficiency and Welfare Distribution
  • 5.5 Reintroducing Conflict of Laws
  • 5.6 What Role for Private International Law?
• 6. Free Movement and the Determination of the Applicable Law
  • 6.1 Private Parties and the Free Movement Provisions
    • 6.1.1 Justification
  • 6.2 Free Movement and Contract Law
    • 6.2.1 The Absence of a Favor Offerentis
  • 6.3 Separating ‘Public’ from ‘Private’
    • 6.3.1 Is Mutual Recognition Appropriate in Contract Law?
    • 6.3.2 Mutual Recognition versus Vested Rights
  • 6.4 Company Law
    • 6.4.1 Real Seat Doctrine under Pressure?
    • 6.4.2 Cartesio
  • 6.5 Surname Law
    • 6.5.1 The Recognition of Rights Acquired under the Laws of another Member State
  • 6.6 Vested Rights
    • 6.6.1 Vested Rights versus Mutual Recognition
    • 6.6.2 The Rebirth of Vested Rights
    • 6.6.3 Vested Rights: A Better Insight to ECJ Case-Law?
    • 6.6.4 Vested Rights Beyond Company and Surname law?
    • 6.6.5 The Duty to Recognise Originates in Union Law
    • 6.6.6 Legitimate Divergence of National Connecting Factors
    • 6.6.7 Legitimate Divergence between Potentially Applicable National Laws
    • 6.6.8 No Vested Rights Doctrine in Contract Law
  • 6.7 The Free Movement and Private Autonomy
    • 6.7.1 The Possibility of Choosing the Applicable Law
    • 6.7.2 The Scope of Alsthom Atlantique
  • 6.8 Specific Rules of Contract Law and the Fundamental Freedoms
    • 6.8.1 How to Distinguish between Rules of Administrative Authorisations and Overriding Mandatory Provisions?
    • 6.8.2 Free Movement and Protective Connecting Factors
  • 6.9 Justification of a Restriction
    • 6.9.1 Legitimate Aim
    • 6.9.2 Suitability
    • 6.9.3 Necessity
  • 6.10 The E-Commerce Directive
    • 6.10.1 Should Article 1 (4) be Ignored?
    • 6.10.2 The Harmonised Field as Overriding Mandatory Provisions
    • 6.10.3 eDate Advertising
    • 6.10.4 The Directive may Affect Private law, but not Conflict of Laws
  • 6.11 Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Index