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Coan, Andrew. Rationing the Constitution: how judicial capacity shapes Supreme Court decision-making / Andrew Coan. — 1 online resource (viii, 265 pages) — <URL:http://elib.fa.ru/ebsco/2034425.pdf>.

Record create date: 3/19/2019

Subject: Constitutional law; Judges — Workload; Judicial process; Constitutional law.; Judges — Workload.; Judicial process.

Collections: EBSCO

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Annotation

The Supreme Court is a tiny institution that can resolve only a fraction of the constitutional issues generated by the American government. This simple yet startling fact is impossible to deny, but few students of the Court have seriously considered its implications. In Rationing the Constitution, Andrew Coan explains how the Court's limited capacity shapes U.S. constitutional law and argues that the limits of judicial capacity powerfully constrain Supreme Court decision-making on many of the most important constitutional questions, spanning federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. Examples include the commerce power, presidential powers, Equal Protection, and regulatory takings. The implications for U.S. constitutional law are profound. Lawyers, academics, and social activists pursuing social reform through the courts must consider whether their goals can be accomplished within the constraints of judicial capacity.--.

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Table of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • I. Understanding Judicial Capacity
    • 1. Structural and Normative Underpinnings
    • 2. The Judicial Capacity Model
    • 3. Refining the Model
    • 4. Testing the Model
  • II. The Judicial Capacity Model Applied
    • Federalism
    • 5. The Commerce Power
    • 6. The Spending Power
      • Separation of Powers
    • 7. The Nondelegation Doctrine
    • 8. Presidential Administration
      • Individual Rights
    • 9. Equal Protection
    • 10. Takings
  • III. Positive and Normative Implications
    • 11. Judicial Capacity and the Constitutional Choice Set
    • 12. Judicial Capacity and Judicial Competence
    • 13. Judicial Capacity and Judicial Independence
    • Conclusion
  • Appendix: Methods
  • Notes
  • Acknowledgments
  • Index

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