In this work Beth Simmons presents a fresh view of why governments decided to abide by or defect from the gold standard during the 1920s and 1930s. Previous studies of the spread of the Great Depression have emphasized "tit-for-tat" currency and tariff manipulation and a subsequent cycle of destructive competition. Simmons, on the other hand, analyzes the influence of domestic politics on national responses to the international economy. In so doing, she powerfully confirms that different political regimes choose different economic adjustment strategies.

• Cover Page
• Half-title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1: Introduction
  • The Problem: Explaining International Economic Relations during the Interwar Years
  • The Argument of This Book
  • Toward an Explanation of the Policy Mix: Methodology and Organization
  • Findings
• Chapter 2: The Interwar Gold Standard
  • The Prewar and Interwar Gold Standards
  • The Norms of Gold Standard Adjustment
  • Explaining Policy Choice during the Interwar Years
  • Conclusions
• Chapter 3: The Determinants of External Imbalance
  • Politics, Credibility, and External Imbalance
  • Capital Movements
  • The Current Account
  • Conclusions
  • Appendix
• Chapter 4: Devaluation
  • Descriptive Statistics: Currency Depreciation
  • On Gold or Off?
  • Explaining Currency Depreciation
  • Domestic Politics and Currency Depreciation: The Evidence
  • Conclusions
  • Cumulative Results
• Chapter 5: France, 1924-1927
  • The Real Economy
  • Cracks in Credibility
  • From a Crack to a Gulf: January I925-July I926
  • The Politics of Credibility
  • Conclusions
• Chapter 6: Tariff Protection
  • Descriptive Statistics of Tariff Protection
  • Explaining Tariff Levels
  • Changes in Tariff Policy
  • Conclusions
  • Cumulative Results
  • Appendix
• Chapter 7: Deficits during Depression: Britain, Belgium, and France in the Thirties
  • Aggregate Introduction to the Cases and to the Policy Mix
  • The Case of Britain, I929-I931
  • The Case of Belgium, 1934-I936
  • The Case of France, I935-I937
  • Conclusions
• Chapter 8: Conclusions
  • The Argument
  • Major Findings
  • Implications for International Cooperation
  • Implications for International Political Economy
  • Parting Words
• Appendix I: General Data Appendix
• Appendix II: Central Bank Independence Data
• Select Bibliography
• Index