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The Handbook of Experimental Economics / Alvin E. Roth, John H. Kagel. — 1 online resource : 69 line drawings 73 tables. — In English. — <URL:http://elib.fa.ru/ebsco/2423859.pdf>.

Record create date: 5/26/2020

Subject: Experimental economics.; Battle of the Sexes game.; Dutch auction.; Ellsberg paradox.; Lindahl equilibrium.; Lindahl mechanism.; Nash bargaining theory.; Prisoner's Dilemma.; Vickery auction.; adaptive models.; auction theory studies.; blind-bid auction.; call market.; description invariance.; efficient outcomes.; fanning in hypothesis.; focal points.; futures market.; illusion of control.; impunity games.; infinite horizon game.; mechanism design.; options market.; posted-bid auctions.; price list auction.; scoring rules.; simulation, computer.; trigger strategies.; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General.

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This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.

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Cover
Half-title page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
Preface
List of Contributors
3. Coordination Problems
- Introduction
- I. Experiments Using Overlapping Generations Environments
  - A. Adaptive Learning Processes and Rational Expectations Equilibria
  - B. The Path of Prices When the Rate of Growth of the Money Stock Is Zero
  - C. Price Inflation with a Growing Money Stock
  - D. Sunspots
- II. Coordination Games with Pareto Ranked Equilibria
  - A. Payoff Dominance, Security and Historical Precedent
  - B. The Relevance of Dominated Strategies
  - C. Influencing Equilibrium Selection
- III. Experiments in Decentralized Matching Environments:Games with Multiple Optimal Equilibria
- IV. Concluding Remarks
- Notes
- Bibliography
4. Bargaining Experiments
- I. Agreements
  - A. Unstructured Bargaining Experiments
  - B. Sequential Bargaining Experiments
    - 1. An Initial Exchange of Views
    - 2. A Larger Experimental Design
    - 3. Investigating Observed Regularities
      - a. Are Players "Trying to Be Fair"?
    - 4. Pursuing Anomalies
      - a. Distinguishing between Alternative Hypotheses
      - b. A Cross-Cultural Experiment
    - 5. Learning and the Role of Experience
- II. Disagreements and Delays
  - A. The Frequency of Disagreements and Delays
  - B. Anonymous versus Face-to-Face Bargaining 294
    - 1. Two Hypotheses
      - a. The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis
      - b. The Communication Hypothesis
    - 2. A New Experiment
    - 3. Some Further Experiments
    - 4. Recapitulation of the Methodological Issues
  - C. Tests of Hypotheses about the Causes of Disagreements and Costly Delays
    - 1. Nonstrategic Models
    - 2. Strategic Models
      - a. Complete Information Models
      - b. Incomplete Information Models
      - c. A Digression on the Strategy Method
  - D. Deadlines
- III. Concluding Remarks
- Notes
- Bibliography
5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research
- I. Overview
- II. Beginnings
- III. The Relevance of Experiments to the Study of IO
  - A. Experiments That Evaluate Behavioral Assumptions
  - B. Tests for Sensitivity to Violations of Structural Assumptions
  - C. Searching for Empirical Regularities
- IV. Design and Procedural Issues
  - A. Instructions
  - B. Design Considerations
- V. Trading Institutions
  - A. Posted Prices
  - B. Uniform Prices
  - C. One-Sided Sequential Auctions
  - D. Double Auctions
  - E. Decentralized Negotiations
  - F. Discounting
  - G. Other Institutions
  - H. Disadvantages of the Cournot Quantity-Choice Institution
- VI. Monopoly Regulation and Potential Entry
  - A. Monopoly
  - B. Decentralized Regulatory Proposals
  - C. Potential Competition as a Regulator: Market Contestability
  - D. Predatory Pricing and Antitrust Remedies
- VII. Market Structure and Market Power
  - A. Definitions of Market Power
  - B. Market Power in Double Auctions
  - C. Market Power in Posted-Offer Auctions
- VIII. Plus Factors That Facilitate Collusion
  - A. Repetition with Different Cohorts: Experience
  - B. Multiperiod Repetition with the Same Cohort
  - C. Pure-Numbers Effects and the Ability to Punish
  - D. Communication
  - E. Contractual Provisions
- IX. Product Differentiation and Multiple Markets
  - A. Product Quality, Asymmetric Information, and Market Failures
  - B. Spatial Competition
  - C. Vertically Related Markets
- X. Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
6. Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey
- I. Informational Efficiency of Markets
  - A. Field Data from Financial Markets
  - B. Designing Experimental Asset Markets
  - C. Dissemination of Information
  - D. Aggregation of Information
  - E. Market for Information
- II. Futures and State-Contingent Claims
- III. Bubbles and False Equilibria
- IV. Learning and Dynamics
  - A. Adjustment Path
  - B. Variables That Transmit Information
  - C. Learning Sequences
  - D. Aggregate Uncertainty
  - E. Role of Arbitrage
  - F. Generation of Bids and Asks
- V. Econometric Comparisons of Field and Laboratory Data
  - A. Variance Bound Tests
  - B. Arbitrage Relationships
- VI. Investment and Public Policy
  - A. Trading Suspensions and Price Change Limits
  - B. Double Auction versus Call Market
  - C. Specialist Privileges and Book Display
  - D. Control of Speculative Bubbles
  - E. Bid-Ask Spread
  - F. Off-Floor and Block Trading
- VII. Laboratory Modeling of Asset Markets
- VIII. Concluding Remarks
- Notes
- Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index

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