"The practice of holding states responsible is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed, praised, punished, obligated, and held liable. On an almost-daily basis, one hears about the latest round of sanctions against the latest rogue state; about the latest treaty that states have signed or repudiated; about the latest heavily-indebted state that is on the brink of bankruptcy; or about what former colonial states owe to their former colonies. The assumption in each case is that the state-as distinct from its individual leaders, officials, or citizens-is the entity that bears the responsibility in question. This book examines the theoretical and normative underpinnings of state responsibility. Why, and under which conditions, should we assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to particular individuals? There are two prevailing theories of state responsibility. The first suggests that states can be held responsible because they are 'moral agents' like human beings, with similar capacities for deliberation and intentional action. A state is responsible in the same way in which an indivdiual is responsible. The second sthat states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through their officials; states are 'principals' rather than agents, and the model for state responsibility is a case of vicariously liability, such as when an employer is held financially liable for the actions of her employee. Sam Fleming reconstructs and develops a forgotten understanding of state responsibility from Thomas Hobbes' political thought. Like proponents of the two theories of state responsibility, Hobbes considered states to be 'persons', meaning that actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed to them. States can be said to wage war, possess sovereignty, and owe money. What makes Hobbes unique is that he does not consider states to be agents or principals. Unlike an agent, the state cannot will or act on its own; it needs representatives to will and act on its behalf. Unlike a principal, the state cannot authorize its own representatives. States are in some ways similar to "Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason", who are "Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors" Although the state is incapable of acting on its own, it can nevertheless exercise rights and incur responsibilities through the representatives that its subjects authorize to act in its name. Hobbes' "Artificiall Man" is conceptually more like an artificial child or "Foole""--.

• Cover
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations of Hobbes’ Works
• Introduction: State Responsibility and Corporate Personality
  • §1 The Idea of State Responsibility
  • §2 The Three Fundamental Questions
  • §3 Back to Hobbes
  • §4 The Structure of the Book
• 1. The Agential and Functional Theories of State Responsibility
  • §5 States as Moral Agents: The Agential Theory
    • §5.1 The Agential Answer to the Question of Ownership
    • §5.2 The Agential Answer to the Question of Identity
    • §5.3 The Agential Answer to the Question of Fulfilment
  • §6 States as Legal Persons: The Functional Theory
    • §6.1 The Functional Answer to the Question of Ownership
    • §6.2 The Functional Answer to the Question of Identity
    • §6.3 The Functional Answer to the Question of Fulfilment
  • §7 The Limitations of the Agential and Functional Theories
• 2. Hobbes and the Personality of the State
  • §8 The Skinner–Runciman Debate
  • §9 The Two Faces of Personhood
  • §10 Hobbes’ Theory of the State
  • §11 Artificial Men and Artificial Animals
    • §11.1 Hobbes’ State as a Corporate Agent
    • §11.2 Hobbes’ State as an Organism
  • §12 The Hobbesian Theory of State Responsibility
• 3. Attribution: The Question of Ownership
  • §13 General and Personal Responsibilities
  • §14 The Conditions for Attribution
    • §14.1 Representation
    • §14.2 Authorization
  • §15 A Hobbesian Account of Attribution
    • §15.1 The Background Conditions for Authorization
    • §15.2 The Form of Authorization
    • §15.3 The Content of Authorization
    • §15.4 Non-State Corporate Entities
  • §16 From Attribution to Responsibility
  • §17 Impersonation of the State
• 4. Succession: The Question of Identity
  • §18 The Concept of Corporate Identity
  • §19 The Conditions for Corporate Identity
    • §19.1 Unity
    • §19.2 Continuity
  • §20 Changes in a Single State
  • §21 Relational Changes
  • §22 Non-Identity
• 5. Distribution: The Question of Fulfilment
  • §23 The Problem of Distribution
  • §24 The Conditions for Distribution
    • §24.1 Intragenerational Distribution
    • §24.2 Intergenerational Distribution
  • §25 The Division of Liability
• Conclusion: The Future of State Responsibility
  • §27 International Criminal Law
  • §28 The Proliferation of Treaties
  • §29. Cyborg States and Robotic Representatives
• Bibliography
• Index
• A Note on the Type