"The concept of legal doctrine and its role in how we understand the structure of law has changed over time, especially with the critique of formal law by American legal realists and their insistence on the pliability of law. And yet doctrine remains central to the expression and analysis of law in the judiciary and among practicing lawyers. Recently interest in doctrine as a legal form that embodies and expresses legal arguments, principles, policies, and values, has revived. Pierre Schlag and Amy J. Griffin seek to further the study of doctrine. How to Do Things with Legal Doctrine argues that careful attention to the form and nature of doctrinal arguments can illuminate the structures by which the law operates. Such an understanding offers legal professionals and students the opportunity to better relate law to a specific case and to comprehend how legal argument, often conducted through doctrines, fits within the judicial system. Schlag and Griffin also show how the study of doctrine can illuminate the similarities between substantive legal fields, as we might see how the doctrine of "consent" in one field is similar to the concept of "assumption of risk" in another"--.

• Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter One: What Is Doctrine?
  • I. The Big Picture
    • A. Artifacts
    • B. Sources of Law
    • C. Functions
      • 1. Structuration
      • 2. Defusing, Resolving, or Extinguishing Conflict
      • 3. Correction
      • 4. Realization of the Legal System
      • 5. Reflexivity
    • D. Legal Elements
      • 1. Legal Persons
      • 2. Entitlements and Disablements
      • 3. Attribution Rules
      • 4. Transfer Mechanisms
      • 5. Interests/Harms
      • 6. Remedies
  • II. Doctrine
    • A. The Characteristics of Doctrine
    • B. The Structured Elasticity of Doctrine
  • III. The Itinerary
• Chapter Two: Frames and Framing
  • I. Entry-Framing
  • II. Broad vs. Narrow Time Frames
  • III. Segmented vs. Continuous Transactions
  • IV. Action vs. Omission
  • V. Level of Abstraction
  • VI. The Theater Metaphor
  • VII. Exit-Framing
• Chapter Three: Baselines
  • I. Baseline Selection Problems
    • A. Classic Baselines
    • B. Variations within a Single Baseline
      • 1. Level of Abstraction
      • 2. Individualization
      • 3. Multiplicity
  • II. Baseline Neutrality Problems
    • A. Failed Neutrality
    • B. Denial and Evasion
  • III. Baseline Collapse Problems
  • IV. Summary
• Chapter Four: The Legal Distinction
  • I. What Do Legal Distinctions Do?
  • II. Three Criteria for “Sound” Legal Distinctions
    • A. Conceptual Intelligibility
    • B. Practicality
    • C. Normative Appeal
  • III. The Trade-Offs among the Three Criteria
  • IV. The Classic Flaws and Why They Matter
    • A. The Classic Flaws
      • 1. Overbreadth
      • 2. Underbreadth
      • 3. Overlap
      • 4. Discontinuity
      • 5. False Dichotomy
      • 6. Incoherence
      • 7. Vagueness
    • B. Why the Classic Flaws Matter: From Form to Substance
      • 1. Waste
      • 2. Fairness/Equality
      • 3. Subversion
      • 4. Efficiency
      • 5. Rule of Law
  • VI. Crafting Legal Distinctions
  • VII. Where Do You Draw the Line?
    • A. The Non-ideal World and the Inevitable Trade-Offs
    • B. Arbitrariness
    • C. Indivisibilities
    • D. Dynamic Fields
    • E. Problem Fields and Non-fields: Of Polycentricity and Flux
    • F. The Slippery Slope
  • VIII. The Fetishism of the Legal Distinction
• Chapter Five: Rules and Standards
  • I. Defining Rules and Standards
  • II. The Rules vs. Standards Dialectic
    • A. Deterrence
    • B. Delegation
    • C. Communication/Formalities/Notice
  • III. The Substantialized Versions of the Dialectic
  • IV. The Limitations of the Dialectic
    • A. Of Vices and Virtues
    • B. The Polycentricity Challenge
    • C. The Epistemological Twist
  • V. The Irreducibility of the Dialectic
• Chapter Six: Resolving Regime Conflicts
  • I. Techniques
    • A. Hierarchy
    • B. Sectorization
    • C. Policy Judgments
    • D. Balancing
    • E. Meta-quantification Approaches
    • F. Conflict Prevention Approaches
    • G. Referral/Deference/Denial
    • H. Channeling
  • II. Putting It Together
    • A. Hybrids
    • B. Entailments
    • C. Summary
• Chapter Seven: Interpretation
  • I. The Interpretive Situation: Recurrent Tensions and Conflicts
    • A. The “Legal” in the Legal Text
    • B. The Interpretive Contexts
      • 1. Fact-Rich
      • 2. Institutionally Localized
      • 3. Procedural Posture
      • 4. Discernible Specific Consequences
    • C. The Textual Feedback Loop
    • D. The Plurality of Contexts
      • 1. The Context of Application
      • 2. The Authorial Context
      • 3. The Addressee Context
      • 4. The Functional Legal Context
      • 5. Contexts Generally
    • E. Fidelity to the Original Meaning
    • F. Summary
  • II. Textualism
    • A. Individuation: What Is the Unit of Interpretation?
    • B. Intratextual Integrity
    • C. Intertextual Integrity
  • III. Purposivism
    • A. Multiple Purposes
    • B. Selection
    • C. The Structure of Purpose
  • IV. Summary
• Chapter Eight: Cluster Logic
  • I. A Cautionary Note
  • II. The Structural Distinction Clusters
  • III. How the Clusters Matter
    • A. The Clusters as Classic Options
    • B. Nuance: Substituting One Distinction or One Term for Another
    • C. Cluster Functions
      • 1. Function Tags for the Choice/Coercion Cluster
      • 2. Function Tags for the Public/Private Cluster
  • IV. Operationalizing the Clusters: Interaction
    • A. Combining Clusters
    • B. The Theatrical Metaphor
  • V. The Logic of Dissociation
    • A. Chaining: Running an Argument through Successive Clusters
    • B. Cluster Alliances
  • VI. Cluster Logic
• Coda: The Topics of Doctrine
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• Index